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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 14

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Soviet External Scene. The main subject of Soviet press comment in the sphere of US-Soviet relations was the President's views on the possible use of nuclear weapons. Distorting the President's remarks by ignoring all his qualifications and supplementary statements, a lengthy Pravda Observer article on March 31 accused the President of adopting the doctrine of preventive war. It concluded that the President's statement not only damaged the Geneva disarmament talks, but also shows that US demands for controls of armaments are designed to locate Soviet rocket bases and nuclear stockpiles as first-strike targets. The article charged that the President wanted to bring pressure on the USSR to make unilateral concessions regarding disputed questions in Europe (obviously Berlin was meant). The article is yet another manifestation of the Soviet compulsion to react strongly and negatively to any US statement which suggests American military superiority or implies a threat against the USSR.

The other major concern of the USSR at present -- its relations with Communist China -- while not the subject of open discussion in the Soviet press, was very obviously close to the surface. There was a hint that the Soviets are backing a reversal of former Chinese internal economic policy, further evidence of a wide gulf between Soviet and Communist China attitudes on disarmament, and a possible clue to differences in Soviet and Communist China interests regarding South Vietnam.

2. Sino-Soviet Developments. On April 3 Pravda took the unusual step (in its press coverage of Chinese affairs of recent years) of publishing the full text of a Peoples Daily editorial on dam-building in Sinkiang. Ostensibly addressed to dam-building, the editorial really seemed intended to present a strong case for more careful planning and utilization of China's economic resources. It could be interpreted as taking issue with the "great leap forward" approach. Reprinting of this editorial in Pravda seems to indicate approval of its general content and conveys the impression that the views advocated, although not yet announced as official Communist Chinese policy, are at least supported by a strong enough body of opinion within the Peking regime to have been printed as the editorial views of Peoples Daily. While some Western observers in Moscow were inclined to see the development as "an increase in Soviet press attention to China" and as possibly foreshadowing an improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations, actually all the action may indicate is that the Soviets sympathize with views which are highly critical of the Chinese "great leap forward" approach to internal economic developments, which until the present has not been rescinded, at least to public knowledge.

Another interesting development involving a Peoples Daily editorial was an account of the Peoples Daily April 3 editorial on disarmament. According to a TASS English-language wire service account of this article, one of its main points was a restatement of the Chinese position that Peiping will not be bound by any agreement on disarmament or in other fields which is worked out without its participation. Almost all Soviet newspapers by April 5 had ignored this news, but the April 4 issue of Izvestiya published

an account of the editorial, omitting the key paragraph indicated above. This Chinese Communist position has been suppressed by Soviet public media presumably because it would suggest to highly embarrassing alternatives: (1) that USSR is flouting the interests of its major ally in participating in the Geneva disarmament talks, thus indicating inability to resolve the Soviet and Chinese positions on a major policy issue; or (2) that Soviet participation in the Geneva talks was purely for propaganda purposes and not really for negotiating on disarmament.

That the realm of theory is still a favored place for Soviet-Chinese conflict was proven by an article by F. Burlatskii in the April 5 issue of Pravda. Burlatskii ridiculed Mao Tse-tung's distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. However, the Pravda article, true to the canons of the Soviet-Chinese debate, did not mention Mao and used different words than he did to explain his theory.

3. Disarmament. Much of the coverage of the disarmament negotiations during the past week involved a play-back of the positions advanced by the Soviet delegation at Geneva opposing the establishment of an international inspection system to verify suspected seismic events. Although Soviet news despatches and commentaries insisted that national inspection systems were now adequate for purposes of detection, no hard evidence was presented which would tend to invalidate the findings and conclusions reached by an international group of scientists, including Soviets, at Geneva in 1958. More and More, Soviet commentators turned to the argument that Western insistence on inspection and control was motivated by a desire to gather data on rocket-nuclear launching sites and Soviet nuclear laboratories and manufacturing plants. According to the Soviets, this information was being eagerly sought after by US militaristic quarters which would be tempted to launch a first strike against the Soviet Union if this information were to become available.

In addition to the above charges, the Soviets continued to claim that the US delegation at Geneva has been trying to avoid consideration of a specific draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and instead has been seeking to draw the committee into consideration of individual measures and into an abstract debate on the general problems of disarmament.

Warnings were also repeated in the Soviet press that the Soviet Union would be compelled to reply with nuclear tests of its own, should the US resume atmospheric tests.

4. South Vietnam Developments. The Soviet press reported on April 3 that the first congress of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam "took place" (with no indication of exact place or date). The Soviet press account said this congress approved of a platform of overthrowing Diem and alleged American rule, the achievement of independence and democracy, and peace and neutrality in South Vietnam. Nothing was said about the Vietnamese Peoples Revolutionary Party formed at the end of 1961 nor about the reunification of North Vietnam. The reference to neutrality as a major element in the Front's political program in fact imply that the Front is not advocating for the time being, at least, that South Vietnam become a part of the DRV (since the latter

is part of a socialist camp and by definition not neutral in the world struggle). This curious reference to neutrality and failure to mention the Peoples Revolutionary Party -- apparently an orthodox Communist Party -- are significant. If there are differences between the Soviet and Chinese press accounts of the political program of the Viet Cong as reflected in the formal programs of the Front and the Peoples Revolutionary Party, this might provide a good means for determining whether there are actually divergent Soviet and Communist Chinese interests regarding South Vietnam at present.

5. Syria. [redacted] Insofar as the Soviet press was concerned, approval of the Mar. 28 coup appeared indirect rather than outright. Despatches from Damascus and Beirut, for example, levelled criticisms at the external and internal policies of the Dawalibi Government, cited the new High Command's statement on foreign policy approvingly, and charged that dissident elements in the north (presumably pro-Nasser) had created a serious danger to Syria by opening the way for imperialist intervention.

Not unexpectedly, the Soviet press capitalized on the visit of the US Sixth Fleet ships to Beirut, charging that it was "provocative" and related to Syrian developments, including the drawing up of Israeli and Turkish troops to the Syrian border.

Thus far, Soviet commentators have scrupulously avoided any mention of Cairo in connection with Syrian developments. Nevertheless, it seemed clear from some accounts that the Soviets were opposed to interference from Cairo. A Pravda commentary, for example, described the current changes in Syria as an internal political process whose course could only be determined by Syrians themselves.

6. East European Party Representatives in Moscow. The press reported that a "party workers" delegation of the Rumanian Workers Party, headed by Central Committee Secretary Dalya, had been visiting the Soviet Union from March 20 until April 3, when they left for home. The press reported that Dalya was received by CPSU Secretary Ilichyev. The press also reported a brief visit, including an interview with Khrushchev, of Polish United Workers Party Secretary and Politburo member Z. Klishko.

At the April 4 National Day reception at the Hungarian Embassy, Charge d'Affaires Olah represented his government and made the traditional (for bloc and some Asian-African embassies in Moscow) toast. Kozlov was the senior Soviet representative present.

7. USIA Criticized. A TASS despatch in the April 3 issue of Pravda reporting the opening of the Soviet Children's Art Exhibition in Washington, said that USIA Director Murrow, who was supposed to have been present at the opening, decided to boycott it. The TASS despatch said that Mr. Murrow did this on the "laughable pretext" that pictures by Soviet children from the Baltic "Republics" were included in the exhibition. But it insinuated that

the real reason was alarm over the alleged popularity of the Exhibition in the US, as indicated by a Washington Post article recommending that Washingtonians visit it. This despatch was published under the caption "Cooperation" - American Style.

8. Berlin/Germany. The first Soviet press substantive reaction to the FRG February 21 response to the much discussed Soviet December 27 memorandum to the FRG proposing the improvement of bilateral relations appeared in the form of a POLYANOV commentary in Izvestiya March 31. Polyanov avoided referring directly to either of the documents in question, but alluded to "a Soviet initiative for normalization of relations with the FRG." Neither of the memoranda has been published in Moscow. The net impression left by Polyanov is that Bonn has placed preposterous preconditions on any improvement in relations and that the immediate outlook is therefore not very promising.

Soviet officials in Moscow, in contrast to their Soviet colleagues in Bonn, are not pursuing individual officers of the FRG Embassy with arguments favoring the development of closer bilateral relations. At the same time, the Soviet press has displayed diminished interest in the themes of the December 27 initiative. Thomas DEHLER's public statements supporting closer bilateral relations have been reported, but with little attempt so far to exploit them.

9. Latin-America. The first serious commentary by the Soviet press on the Argentine crisis appeared in the weekly, Za Rubezhom (March 31). The article claimed the election results were in fact a setback for the American plan to "recolonize Latin America. No direct attack was made on Pres. Frondizi who was portrayed as a victim of reactionary pressures. Much of the article was devoted to a defensive explanation of why the Communist Party had found it necessary to ally itself with the Peronista organization.

The series of articles on Central America, which first began to appear after the Punta del Este meetings, continued this week with a feature article in Izvestiya criticizing the regime in Salvador and articles on growing opposition to the government in Guatemala. The articles emphasized that the outlook for "progressive" movements in Central America is optimistic but suggested Soviet concern over the development of collective measures by governments of the Middle American republics.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

10. Leadership. The members of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee continued to show themselves in public with a frequency unparalleled since the XXII Congress.

On March 30, the Presidium, minus KUUSINEN, PODGORNYY, SHVERNIK, and VORONOV, turned up at the Exhibition of Achievements of the Economy of the USSR to look at new models of trucks, buses, and the Moskvich.

On March 31, with Kuusinen joining them, they went along to a reception given in the Kremlin by the presidium of the III All-Union Congress of Composers. In a toast that received low-key treatment in the press, KHRUSHCHEV "noted the great

role of music in the construction of Communism" (Pravda, April 1).

Music continued to provide the excuse for their outing on April 1, when, with BREZHNEV, Voronov, Kuusinen, Podgornyy, SUSLOV, and Shvernik missing, a minority of five Presidium members attended the opening of the II International Chaykovskiy Competition.

On April 2, a quorum was again to be seen. Only Khrushchev, Shvernik, and Voronov did not appear when the Presidium CC-CPSU attended the final concert of the III Composers' Congress. Podgornyy, who had presided at an agricultural plenum of the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party on March 29-30, had come up from Kiev to join the other members of the Presidium. The occasion of his trip to the center may have been a full meeting of the Presidium to reach agreement on a thirteen-day postponement in the convocation of the new Supreme Soviet (Pravda, April 6).

On April 4, Khrushchev received GOMULKA's right-hand man, Zenon KLISZKO, a member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party. That evening, Koslov and Kosygin did the honors at a reception in the Hungarian Embassy in honor of the 17th anniversary of the "liberation" of Hungary by the Red Army in 1945.

Shvernik has not been identified by the press as attending events at which the Presidium appeared, since March 16, when he attended the pre-election meeting in the Kremlin addressed by Khrushchev. Voronov may be busy in his new capacity of Chairman of the RSFSR Committee on Agriculture, a job that is presumably particularly engrossing in view of the regime's attempt to carry through the agricultural reorganization decreed by the March plenum during the current period of intensive preparations for the spring plowing and sowing campaign.

11. Stiff Sentences Meted Out to Economic Offenders. In the RSFSR, a grain speculator has been condemned to death, and in Lithuania, site of previous spectacular trials of economic "criminals", a new trial has begun.

An item in Pravda (April 5, 1962) indicates that M. I. MALYY, one of a ring of grain swindlers in Pyatigorsk, was sentenced to be shot by the Supreme Court of the RSFSR on the basis of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 5, 1961, "On the Strengthening of the Struggle against Especially Dangerous Crimes." The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR had rejected a plea for leniency. Other members of the ring were stated to have been sentenced to long terms of "deprivation of liberty." Their offense was described by Pravda as falsifications in the weighing, determination of moisture content, and grading, of grain delivered by collective and state farms, and the selling of the resulting surplus. Malyy is said to have had cash, savings, and valuables totaling over 113,000 rubles at the time of his arrest.

Sovetskaya Litva has announced the beginning, on March 26, 1962, of a new trial of economic offenders in Kaunas. In the dock are the former deputy director of the Kaunas meat trust, T. BANAGAS, and another former functionary of the meat trust, Yu. TAMASHAUSKAS, as well as lesser offenders. They allegedly embezzled goods worth over 2,000,000 old rubles and engaged in

currency speculations with their profits. The last major trial in Lithuania culminated in four death sentences (WEEKA No. 7, February 15, 1962).

12. Soviet Civilian Defense Preparations. During the past week, a further Republic conference of the Soviet civilian defense and military assistance organization, DOSAAF, took place (WEEKA No. 13, March 30). Kazakhstanskaya Pravda reported, on March 27, that the third conference of DOSAAF in that Republic would begin the next day. The Republic secretary of DOSAAF, K. BOSHAYEV, was quoted as saying that in Kazakhstan the organization has more than 2,300,000 members. It has reportedly trained more than 300,000 drivers, tractor and combine operators, and radio technicians in the past four years, and will prepare more than 100,000 agricultural mechanics this year.

In the Moldavian press, there was mention, on March 29, of the use of a DOSAAF shooting range for a seven-day marksmanship contest.

13. Nationalist Survivals Among the Youth. N. S. Khrushchev, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, noted the "growing inclination of the non-Russian people to learn the Russian language" and foretold an eventual "complete unity of nations" in the Soviet Union. He warned that "even the smallest manifestation of nationalist survivals must be eradicated with complete Bolshevist irreconcilability."

The regime is evidently concerned by continuing evidences of "nationalist survivals" among the youth.

Nearly the whole front page of Sovetskaya Latviya on March 30 was devoted to the first part of an address by A. E. VOSS, a Central Committee Secretary of the Latvian CP, on the subject of Latvian youth.

Speaking at a Central Committee Plenum of the Latvian CP, Voss called attention to shortcomings in fulfilling the resolution of the XXII Congress requiring that the youth be educated in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and friendship among nations. He complained that the majority of educational institutions in Latvia have only one or two "friendship evenings" a year and that the teaching of the "glorious revolutionary past of the Latvian Party organization and its unbreakable ties with the All-Russian revolutionary movement" has been neglected. He recommended the "strengthening of the ties of our educational institutions with schools and universities of the RSFSR as well as with other fraternal republics" through visits and exchanges of students and instructors. He also recommended the creation of schools with parallel courses in the Russian and Latvian languages, citing the experiences of the Ogrskiy and Yekabpilsskiy districts, where "children of Latvian and Russian nationality live like one happy family." Elsewhere in his speech Voss complained of a "defensive" attitude toward religious survivals, the aping of Western "petty-bourgeois" customs by Latvian youth, and hooliganism, drunkenness, and "other immoral acts" in student dormitories.

In Uzbekistan, Republic Komsomol First Secretary, M. I. IBRAGIMOV, addressing the XVII Congress of the Komsomol of Uzbekistan on March 28, called for a "relentless struggle against feudal-bey survivals in the attitude of a certain

sector of the youth." He said that, "to our shame, even some workers of the Komsomol harbor survivals of the past," and cited the case of a city secretary of the Komsomol whose brother (in [illegible] tradition) had married a fourteen-year-old girl.

Under Khrushchev, as under Lenin, it is the nationalism of the minorities that is objectionable. The Leninist term, "Great Russian chauvinism," remains in disuse.

14. Anti-Religious Campaign Brightened by Television. Television has been added to the media used by the Soviet regime in fighting religion. A forty-minute Moscow TV program on the evening of April 5 was presented as one of a new series. Personnel of the atheist magazine, Science and Religion, interviewed leading scientists; a burning-at-the-stake scene from an old film was shown, and considerable time was devoted to a nineteenth-century French book by Leo TAKSIL (transliteration from Russian), translated and published in the Soviet Union as The Funny Bible (Zabavnaya Bibliya).

In a more practical treatment of the religious problem, a court in Karaganda, according to an item in Komsomol'skaya Pravda of March 31, sentenced eleven Jehovah's Witnesses to various terms of imprisonment. V. GECHA, I. ANDRONIK, and D. SAVCHUK, apparently considered the worse offenders, received ten-year sentences. The trial was conducted in the city club, where the culprits' typewriters, religious tracts, and "instructions on how to behave before investigative organs" were displayed "on long tables."

An article in Sovetskaya Litva (March 29, 1962) tells of an Orthodox archpriest, NIKONYUK-ORENBURGSKIY, who allegedly swindled an aged widow out of her estate and "buried his conscience" along with her body.

MILITARY

Negative

FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I.

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